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PRUDENTIAL PROPERTY AND
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY,
a corporation,

]
]
]

Defendant-Respondent.

]

BRIEF OF APPELLEE/RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is vested in this Court by this Court's Order
of October 27, 1989 and by Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(3)(j)
(1989 cumulative supplement).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The following issues are presented for review:
1.

Are there adequate grounds to support the trial

court's ruling, based on the memoranda filed and prior case law
as follows:
(a)

Under Rule 4-501(2), Utah Code of Judicial

Administration, are the facts set forth in defendant's (movant's)
Memorandum in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment
sufficient to support the trial court's ruling?
(b)

Is the trial court's ruling in the face of an

allegedly incomplete record presumptively supported by competent
1

evidence?
2.

Is a household exclusion within a homeowner's policy

not contrary to public policy?
3.

Has Plaintiff failed to present evidence that the

insurance contract in question is an adhesion contract and,
therefore, has failed to meet her burden of proof in overturning
the same?
4.

Is Plaintiff barred from claiming ambiguity in the

insurance contract when she did not raise that issue below in any
argument or by the pleadings?
5.

Assuming arguendo Plaintiff is entitled to raise the

ambiguity issue, is the insurance contract ambiguous?
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
Rule 4-501(2), Utah Code of Judicial Administration,
provides:
(a) Memorandum in support of a motion. The points
and authorities in support of a motion for summary
judgment shall begin with a section that contains a
concise statement of material facts as to which
movant contends no genuine issue exists. The facts
shall be stated in separate numbered sentences and
shall specifically refer to those portions of the
record upon which the movant relies•
(b) Memorandum in opposition to a motion. The
points and authorities in opposition to a motion
for summary judgment shall begin with a section
that contains a concise statement of material facts
as to which the parties contend a genuine issue
exists. Each disputed fact shall be stated in
separate numbered sentences and shall specifically
ref€*r to those portions of the record upon which
the opposing party relies, and, if applicable,
2

shall state the numbered sentence or sentences of
the movant's facts that are disputed• All
materials facts set forth in the movant's statement
and properly supported by an adequate reference to
the record shall be deemed admitted for the purpose
of summary judgment unless specifically
controverted by the opposing party's statement•
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff has alleged that she purchased a homeowner's
policy, through her husband, from Defendant on June 1, 1982.
3).

(R.

The policy contained an endorsement excluding liability

coverage for household members. (R. 3-4, and 7-20).

Two years

later, on April 18, 1984, an accident occurred in which Plaintiff
injured her son. (R. 4-5). On March 25, 1988, Plaintiff's
husband sued her for the son's injury (R. 5, 21-22), and
plaintiff filed this declaratory judgment action claiming the
insurance contract was a contract of adhesion (R. at 3) and the
household exclusion was contrary to public policy (R. at 4)
because it failed to honor the Plaintiff's reasonable
expectations regarding policy coverage.
On May 22, 1989, Defendant filed a Motion to Publish the
Depositions of Plaintiff and her husband, Roscoe Ashley Allen,
(R. at 62) and a Motion for Summary Judgment on June 5, 1989 (R.
at 64), along with a supporting Memorandum. (R. 66-73), which
contained uncontroverted facts.

(R. 66-69).

Plaintiff filed a

Memorandum in Opposition (R. 76-82), which contained "additional
relevant facts" and did not controvert Defendant's statement of
3

the facts. (R. 76-77).

Both parties quoted from the depositions

which were filed with the court.

Plaintiff requested oral

argument (R. 92) and the trial court granted oral argument. (R.
94).

The depositions in question were filed with the clerk prior

to the hearing.

The court heard argument on the motion for

summary judgment on August 4, 1989 and granted Defendant's Motion
for Summary Judgment. (R. 98-99).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court properly relied on the facts in the
Memoranda submitted by the parties.

Rule 4-501(2)(b), Utah Code

of Judicial Administration, provides that all material facts set
forth in the movant's statement and properly supported by an
accurate reference to the record shall be deemed admitted for the
purposes of summary judgment, unless the opposing party
specifically controverts those facts.
were not controverted.
facts.

In this case, those facts

Basically, the parties stipulated to the

Moreover, any missing portions of the record are presumed

to support the trial judge's decision.
The Plaintiff has presented no evidence and no case law
supporting her claims that the policy endorsement excluding
liability coverage for household members in a homeowner's policy
is contrary to public policy.

In fact, the majority of courts

which have considered the issue have upheld such policy language.
Plaintiff has presented no evidence that the contract is
4

an adhesion contract, nor that it is void as a result.

Plaintiff

never read the policy (R. at 68; Deposition of R. Allen at 29-33;
Deposition of Plaintiff at 10). She never shopped for different
policies (Id.; Deposition of Plaintiff at 6-7, 12-13, 24, 56 and
60-62), and she never bothered to read it upon receipt. (R. at
68-69; Deposition of R. Allen at 29-33; Deposition of Plaintiff
at 10, 13 and 20).

She had never read the policy even after the

filing of this lawsuit and at the time of her deposition. (R. 69;
Deposition of Plaintiff at 35-36, 46-47).
Plaintiff never claimed ambiguity in the policy language
in her Complaint, Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion for
Summary Judgment or at any other time.
raising it now.

She is barred from

Even assuming arguendo that she is allowed to

raise that issue, the endorsement is clear and unambiguous.
ARGUMENT
Point I
THERE IS AN ADEQUATE RECORD TO SUPPORT THE TRIAL
COURT'S RULING; MOREOVER, AN INADEQUATE RECORD
PRESUMPTIVELY SUPPORTS THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING.
A. Facts Set Forth In Support Of A Motion For Summary Judgment,
And Which Are Not Controverted, Are Deemed Admitted.
Rule 4-501(2)(b), Utah Code of Judicial Administration,
clearly provides that facts in a movant's brief which are not
controverted by the opposing memorandum are admitted.

A review

of the briefs filed by the parties shows that Plaintiff did not
controvert the facts listed by Defendant.
5

Both parties relied on

these facts and the court, under the local rules, had before it
courtesy copies of the briefs and parts of the depositions.
Since both parties relied on the same parts of the depositions
and since those parts were not controverted, those facts set
forth in Defendant's Memorandum in Support of its Motion for
Summary Judgment are admitted.

In effect, the parties stipulated

to the facts and the court applied the law.

Therefore, the court

had an adequate factual basis to make its decision.
B. Even If The Record Is Inadequate, The Missing Portions Are
Presumed To Support The Trial Court's Ruling.
In Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938 (Utah 1987), the
district court granted a motion to enforce a settlement agreement
and to set aside a default judgment.

A dispute arose whether

certain parties had fulfilled a condition precedent to trigger
the enforcement of the settlement agreement.

No transcript of

the hearing was available to the Utah Supreme Court upon appeal
of the trial court's rulings.

The Supreme Court held:

We have previously indicated that when crucial
matters are not in the record, the missing portions
are presumed to support the trial judge.
Id. at 943. (citations omitted).
In the instant case, the missing transcripts, if indeed
they are considered as missing, are presumed to support the trial
judge's ruling.

Therefore, the record is adequate.

6

Point II
THE HOUSEHOLD EXCLUSION IS NOT VOID AS CONTRARY TO
PUBLIC POLICY.
The endorsement in question, found at the record at page
14, provides:
Under Coverage-Personal liability, this policy
does not apply to bodily injury to any Insured
under parts (1) and (2) of the definition of
"Insured".
Section (1) is found within the record from pages 16 through 18,
which describes the property and interests covered, and Section
(2) is found at the record at pages 18-20, which concerns
personal liability coverage and which is the subject of the
lawsuit in question.
Plaintiff has relied on cases pertaining to no-fault
automobile insurance policies, which are inapplicable.

In each

of the cases cited by Plaintiff, Mutual of Enunclaw Ins. Co. v.
Wiscomb, 97 Wa.2d 203, 643 P.2d 441 (1982); Estep v. State Farm
Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 703 P.2d 882 (N.M. 1985); and Transamerica
Ins. Co. v. Rovle, 656 P.2d 820 (Mt. 1983), the state supreme
courts found that where the legislature had mandated automobile
insurance to protect the public against negligent drivers, that
the household exclusion was void as a matter of public policy
since the legislatures had not carved out such an exception by
legislation.

Even this court has upheld a household exclusion in

an automobile policy as to coverage in excess of the minimum
7

statutory limit.

State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co. v. Mastbaum,

748 P.2d 10i42 (Ut. 1987).

The household exclusion is not viewed

as contrary to public policy.
Former Utah Code Annotated § 31-19-36(1) (1953), which was
in effect at the time the policy was issued, renewed and the
injury to Plaintiff's son, provided that each policy was to be
construed according to the entirety of its terms, including any
riders, endorsements or applications made a part of it.
Homeowner's policies are not automobile policies.

The latter are

mandatory and heavily regulated by the legislature.

Homeowner's

are not obligated by statute to secure or maintain homeowner's
insurance.
question.

There is no statute prohibiting the endorsement in
Defendant may limit its obligations to provide

coverage by clear and unmistakable language.

Wagner v. Farmer's

Ins. Exchange. 125 Ut.Adv.Rpt. 62, 63 (Court of Appeals, January
9, 1990),

P.2d

. Therefore, the policy terms are

interpreted according to their plain meaning.

Id.

Courts which

have analy2:ed similar homeowner's endorsements have upheld them
in the fac€* of public policy attacks.
In State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Clendening, 150
Cal.App.3d 40, 197 Cal.Rpt. 377 (1984), the court considered the
same langueige.

The court found the fact that the legislature had

not entered the area evidenced a legislative intent to allow such
exclusions.

The California courts have consistently followed
8

this reasoning.

In Lumberman's Mutual Cas. Co. v. Vaughn, 244

Cal.Rpt. 567 (Cal.App.6D 1988), the court recognized that a
similar exclusion was common and enjoyed judicial support to
prevent intrafamily legal actions when such actions may not be
adversary and in which the insurer has little or no control.

The

court also recognized that to read out such exclusions would be
unprecedented judicial interference into private contracts and
economic arrangements.

Id. at 573.

In State Farm Fire & Cas.

Co. v. Alstadt, 113 Cal.App.3d 33, 169 Cal.Rpt. 593 (1980), the
appellate court affirmed summary judgment for the insurer under a
homeowner's policy with exactly the same exclusionary language as
before this Court. The court rejected the attack taken by the
insured that the exclusion violated public policy.
The California analysis is not unique.

Id. at 596.

Other

jurisdictions have reached the same conclusions.

In Suba v.

State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 129 Misc.2d 839, 494 N.Y.Sp.2d 620
(1985), the supreme court of Oneida County upheld the family
exclusion in a homeowner's policy with regard to a ski accident
suffered by the insured's daughter.

The court reached its

conclusion on the grounds that homeowner's insurance is entirely
voluntary and no statutory requirements reflected public policy
regarding its provisions.

494 N.Y.Sp.2d at 621. This court also

recognized that imposing a public policy limitation would be an
unauthorized judicial intrusion into the rights of the parties of
9

an insurance contract and to the determination of the obligations
regarding premiums paid.

Jd.

Absent legislation, the court felt

the parties could insert whatever conditions and agreements they
chose.

Id. at 627. The Minnesota Supreme Court reached a

similar result in Merseth v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 390
N.W.2d 16 (Mn. 1986), holding the family exclusion was clear and
written in simple language and there was no room for construing
the policy under the reasonable expectations of the insured
doctrine.

The New Hampshire Supreme Court in Sciaudone v. Steuk,

512 A.2d 1108 (N.H. 1986), found the family exclusion enforceable
because it was not contrary to public policy.

In State Farm Fire

& Casualty Co. v. Holeczv, 152 Ill.App.3d 448, 504 N.E.2d 971
(Ist.Dis. 1987), the court refused to extend coverage for a
contribution action under a similarly-worded homeowner's
exclusion even in the face of no-fault automobile cases and
legislation which had declared such exclusions as void in the
face of public policy.

In Marchese v. State Farm Fire & Cas.

Co.. 396 So.2d 490 (La. 1981), the Louisiana court upheld summary
judgment for the insurer for the same exclusion as found in the
Prudential policy, finding that it was not against public policy.
Even the Washington Supreme Court has rejected the public
policy attcick in a homeowner's policy when it has upheld the same
attack in an automobile insurance policy, as cited by Plaintiff
in her briesf in the case of Mutual of Enumclaw, supra.
10

In State

Farm General Ins. Co. v. Emerson, 102 Wa.2d 477, 687 P.2d 1139
(1984), the Washington Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment
for the insurer in considering the same exclusionary language
found in the case before this Court.

The court held that

automobile cases were not applicable because of legislation in
the area.

The court recognized the burden of proof was on the

insured to show the exclusion was injurious to public health,
public morals, or public confidence in the purity of the
administration of law or that it undermined a sense of individual
rights.
Point III
IN THE COURT BELOWf PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PRODUCE ANY
EVIDENCE THE POLICY WAS AN ADHESION CONTRACT AND
DID NOT MEET HER BURDEN OF PROOF TO RESIST THE
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
Defendant moved for summary judgment and set forth facts
in its supporting Memorandum.

Plaintiff did not controvert those

facts, but added several more facts.

Once a motion for summary

judgment is made, the adverse party cannot rest upon mere
allegations or denials, but "must set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."

Brigham Truck

& Implement Co. v. Fridal, 746 P.2d 1171 (Ut. 1987).

Utah Rule

56(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, is identical in wording to
Federal Rule 56(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

In

Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 587 (1986), the United States Supreme Court held that a
11

party opposing a motion for summary judgment must come forward
with "specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial."
In Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 254 (1986), the
U.S. Supreme Court further held that the trial judge must view
evidence through the prism of the substitive evidentiary burden.
In the case before this Court plaintiff produced no evidence that
she had no alternative in securing a policy with coverage.
Basically, her claim is based on the "the fervent hope usually
engendered by loss," Wagner v. Farmer's Ins. Exchange, supra at
64.
Plaintiff did not read the policy (R. at 5; Deposition of
Plaintiff ctt 21-22) before the accident or even after she
commenced her lawsuit. (R. 66-69).
her policy. (Id.)

She never negotiated for her

She never compared other policies. (Id.)

She

produced no evidence raising the issue that the contract is an
adhesion contract and she could not secure a different policy.
She was under no obligation by law to secure a homeowner's
policy.

As recognized by the Washington Supreme Court in its

analysis in Emerson, supra, it was her burden to come forward and
show deficiency of the exclusion and that the contract in
question wcis adhesive and which should be declared void.

The

record is devoid of any such evidence, other than her bare
allegations.
In Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch & Livestock
12

Co., Inc., 706 P.2d 1028 (Ut. 1985), this Court reversed the
trial court's finding of unconscionability in a contract relating
to oil and gas royalty rights.

This Court discussed substantive

unconscionability and procedural unconscionability.

Substantive

unconscionability examines the fairness of the contractual
obligations assumed.

Ld. at 1041.

In the case at bar, there is

not a scintilla of evidence that the mutual obligations are
disparate.
question.

Plaintiff could have refused to buy the policy in
She has presented no evidence that she was burdened by

the payments, which she could have cancelled at any time.

She

has not shown oppression or unfair surprise by one-sided contract
terms.

She has shown no overall imbalance of obligations,

excessive price or significant cost-price disparity.

Jd. at

1041-42.
Similarly, her record is devoid of evidence of procedural
unconscionability which examines the parties' positions and the
manner in which the contract was negotiated.
form regarding the contract.
otherwise.

There is a printed

Practicality cannot dictate

However, she has failed to show the contract terms

are incomprehensible, or divert her attention, or are
inconspicuous and deceptive.
compelled to accept.
made more clear.

She has failed to show she was

Id. at 1047. The endorsement could not be

It is set apart in clear and simple language

and not hidden within the body of the policy.
13

More importantly,

there is no dispute that the Plaintiff had in her possession the
policy and endorsement in question for at least two years before
the loss.

Plaintiff is attempting to determine unconscionability

by hindsight, which is not permissible. Id. at 1043.

Basically,

her claim is based on "the fervent hope usually engendered by
loss."

Wagner, supra at 64.
Point IV
Plaintiff IS BARRED FROM ARGUING THE ENDORSEMENT IS
AMBIGUOUS AND SHE NEVER SO CLAIMED IN ANY ASPECT OF
THE LOWER COURT PROCEEDINGSAs this Court has stated:
We have held that matters not raised at the
tricil court level will not be considered by this
Court on appeal, particularly, when the problem
could have been resolved below.

Mascaro, supra at 944. (citations omitted).

This Court will

decline to address for the first time on appeal an issue not
raised by the pleadings and not addressed by the trial court.
Lane v. Messer, 731 P.2d 488, 491 (Ut. 1986).
In the case at bar, Plaintiff has never raised the issue
of ambiguity.

It is nowhere to be found in her Complaint, her

Reply Memorandum to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment nor
in any other part of the record.

This Court should decline to

review that issue at this late point.

14

Point V
ASSUMING ARGUENDO Plaintiff IS ALLOWED TO RAISE THE
ISSUE OF AMBIGUITY, SHE HAS PRESENTED NO EVIDENCE
IN SUPPORT OF THE AMBIGUITY; MOREOVER, THE COURTS
HAVE RULED THAT THE PROVISION IS CLEAR AND
UNAMBIGUOUS.
The exclusionary endorsement set forth is simple and
clear.

Other courts have considered it and upheld it, in the

face of such attacks.

In Suba v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.,

114 A.D.2d 280, 498 N.Y.Supp.2d 656 (1986), the court reviewed a
similarly-worded exclusion and held it was not ambiguous.
Similarly, the California courts have rejected such attacks for
almost identical policy language. Alstadt, supra. and
Clendeninq, supra.

The New Hampshire court in Sciaudone, supra,

and the Minnesota Supreme Court in Merseth, supra, both rejected
the same contentions for similarly-worded exclusions.
Without ambiguity, the insured's reasonable expectations
doctrine does not come into play.
supra.

Vaughn, supra, and Merseth,

Therefore, the Court, if it is inclined to consider the

ambiguity argument, should reject it.
CONCLUSION
Under Rule 4-501, Utah Code of Judicial Procedure, there
is a factual record before the trial court to support its ruling.
There were no controverted facts.

The facts set forth in

Defendant's Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary
Judgment are deemed admitted for the purposes of summary
15

judgment.

If there are any aspects of the record missing, those

aspects presumptively support the court's ruling.

Moreover, the

majority rule rejects public policy attacks on household
exclusions in homeowner's policies, because they are not
mandatory.

Plaintiff has also failed to present evidence that

the insurance contract in question was an adhesion contract and
that it was either procedurally unconscionable or substantively
unconscionable.

She has the burden to come forward with such

evidence and did not do so.

Since she is raising ambiguity for

the first time on appeal, she is barred from doing so.

Even

assximing arguendo that she could raise that issue, the very same
policy language has been considered by a number of courts, all of
which have found it clear and unambiguous.

Therefore, the

judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this <P 7

day of April, 1990.

HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH

Ty^J.' TSAKALOS
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused four (4) copies of the
foregoing Brief of Plaintiff/Appellant to be mailed by firstclass mail, postage prepaid on this JL 7* day of April, 1990, to
the following:
H. Ralph Klemm
349 South 200 East, Suite 560
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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